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This event study uses economic forecasts and opinion polls to measure the response of expec-
tations to election surprise. Use of forecast data complements older work on partisan cycles by
allowing a tighter link between election and response thereby mitigating concerns of endogeneity
and omitted variables. I ¯nd that forecasters respond swiftly and signi¯cantly to election sur-
prise. I further argue that the response ought to vary across countries with di®erent institutional
foundations. In support, I ¯nd that there exist three distinct patterns in forecasters' responses
to partisan surprise corresponding to Hall and Soskice's three varieties of capitalism. In liberal
market economies, forecasters expect the left to achieve jobless growth with virtually no cost to
in°ation. In Mediterranean market economies, forecasters expect the left to achieve deliver both
higher output growth and lower unemployment but with higher in°ation. And in coordinated
market economies, forecasters expect the left to deliver lower growth, higher unemployment,
and higher in°ation.
Keywords: political business cycle, varieties of capitalism, forecast data, opinion polls
JEL Classi¯cation Codes: E32, E63, P16, P51
1 Introduction
An Example of Politically Induced Macroeconomic Volatility
The National Election Study conducted over the two months prior to the US Presidential election of
November 7th, 2000 showed Democratic candidate Al Gore with a nine point lead over Republican
candidate George W. Bush among intended voters. However, election-day proved the contest was
essentially a dead heat and, due to ballot recounts in Florida, did not produce a victor. For 36 days
the identity of the victor was in doubt until, late in the night on December 12th, the US Supreme
Court ruled to halt the vote-recount resulting in a victory for Bush on the morning of December
13th.
¤Much of the work on this project took place while I was a graduate student at the Stanford Graduate School
of Business. I am indebted to Peter Latusek and Jackson Library at the Stanford Graduate School of Business
for purchasing the expectations data. I am also grateful to Olivier Blanchard, Jon Bendor, Bob Hall, Douglas
Hibbs, Francisco Rodriguez, William Shughart, Justin Wolfers, and especially Romain Wacziarg for helpful comments
and to seminar participants at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, the Stanford Department of Economics,
Georgetown School of Foreign Service, Wesleyan Department of Economics, the 8th INFER Annual Conference, and
the First World Meeting of the Public Choice Societies for useful feedback.
1Figure 1: Forecasts Shift Strongly Following the Surprise US Election Results of 2000
Election Results and the Economy: 
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During this period from early September 2000 through late December 2000 as the election
slipped from Gore to Bush, projections of US GDP growth in 2001 from the Consensus Economics
panel of forecasters show a major shift in expectations. As election-day revealed a virtual tie
rather than the expected Gore victory, the average forecast of 2001 calendar year GDP growth
dropped one half of one percentage point. Upon resolution of the stando® in Bush's favor by the
Supreme Court, the average of GDP growth forecasts dropped another half-point. Expected bond
yields also plunged, witnessing a one-time drop of six tenths of a point in the month following the
Supreme Court ruling (see Figure 1). This episode points to an intriguing connection between the
information revealed during elections and the expected subsequent performance of the economy.
This reaction of economic forecasts to changes in the expected political leadership can be used
to infer the expected di®erence in economic performance between the policies of the political left
and right. The fact that these partisan di®erences translate into politically-induced macroeconomic
volatility has been demonstrated by work on the partisan political business cycle and makes these
di®erences interesting and worth measuring and characterizing.
In this paper, I examine the response of economic forecasts to changes in expected political
leadership in industrialized countries. There are three main results. First, I ¯nd that forecasts
respond strongly to partisan surprise, indicating that forecasters do perceive important di®erences
between the macroeconomic policies of the left and right and expect those di®erences to translate
into di®erent macroeconomic outcomes. I also proceed to demonstrate that these forecasters are
capable of processing political information reasonably accurately. Forecasts are ideal for measuring
these partisan e®ects because they are jump variables and can respond to information much more
quickly than macroeconomic state variables, allowing for a much tighter link between cause and
e®ect. Use of forecast data complements older work on politically-induced macroeconomic volatility
which measured responses in macroeconomic variables several years after the election and thus
raised questions of endogeneity, omitted variables, and the power of the tests.
2Second, I argue that the response of forecasts to election surprise ought to depend on the
institutional organization of the economy in question. This is because (a) the political cleavage
over economic policy is a function of the underlying organization of the economy in question and
(b) the ability of a government to enact its platform is a function of the institutions of governance
which are at least correlated and likely co-evolved with the economic institutions. As a result,
the economic e®ects of political surprise should vary considerably across countries. I ¯nd strong
evidence that this is the case. The perceived di®erence between the policies of the left and right in
liberal market economies is very di®erent than the di®erence between left and right in coordinated
market economies. The novel implication is that liberal market economies and coordinated market
economies ought to experience rather di®erent politically induced macro-economic volatility.
Finally, I argue that, in its e®ects on macroeconomic variables, ¯scal policy is more than simply
a choice of the degree of aggregate demand stimulus. As a result, political e®ects should be more
complex than simple oscillation along an unemployment-in°ation tradeo®. The results support
this notion of a multi-dimensional policy-space. Forecasters clearly believe the di®erence between
parties' policies to be more complicated than a simple choice of position on a short-run Phillips
curve. In some countries, the perceived di®erence between parties is a classic tradeo® between
output/unemployment and in°ation. But in other countries, one party is expected to increase
output without any e®ect on unemployment or in°ation. And in a third group of countries, one
party is expected to simultaneously increase output, decrease unemployment, and decrease in°ation
compared to its (economically less competent) political opposition.
In the course of the study, I introduce two data sets: a commercially available data set on
expectations which is new to this literature and a set of pre-electoral opinion polls which I have
assembled for this study in order to quantify the change in expected political leadership resulting
from an election.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section brie°y reviews the theory and basic data on
partisan political business cycles and argues that we ought to expect heterogeneous cycles. Section
three outlines the measurement strategy. Section four introduces the new data sets for forecasts
and opinion polls. Sections ¯ve and six detail the construction of the necessary variables from these
data and the resulting speci¯cation and estimation technique. Section seven presents and discusses
the results. Section eight investigates the rationality of the forecasts. Section nine concludes.
2 Heterogeneous Partisan Cycles
As a choice between alternate policy platforms, an election reveals information about future aggre-
gate demand policy. An election can deliver a surprise change in policy even if parties are credibly
committed to policies whose e®ects are correctly anticipated because the election resolves the un-
certainty of which policy will be chosen by the electorate (Alesina 1989). Because they suddenly
resolve the political uncertainty, elections are e®ectively shocks to future aggregate demand pol-
icy. Because of their high visibility and the consequent availability of data, elections constitute an
excellent event for study by both macro-economists and political economists. They constitute a
semi-regular series of policy-shocks whereby macro-economists can examine the formation and prop-
agation of expectations, the sources of nominal rigidities in the economy, and the micro-foundations
of the e®ects of macro-economic policies. Simultaneously, election cycles are an opportunity for
political economists to study the e®ective di®erences between parties' policy platforms, the degree
to which parties' commitment to platforms is perceived as credible, and the extent that platforms
are informative signals of future policy.
3Political business cycle theories seek to explain that portion of cyclic behavior in macroeconomic
variables which is related to the timing, characteristics, and outcomes of elections. The goal is to elu-
cidate the mechanism by which electoral politics introduces additional °uctuations in the economy.
The partisan political business cycle is a collection of facts concerning the relation between election
results and post-electoral economic performance. In his seminal article and subsequent book, Hibbs
(1977, 1987) presents evidence of partisan e®ects on output, unemployment, and in°ation in a dozen
industrialized democracies. Left-wing administrations preside over periods of higher output growth,
lower unemployment, and higher in°ation compared to their right-wing counterparts. Further work
has shown partisan e®ects on output growth rates and unemployment rates tend to be temporary,
disappearing within a year or two of the election, while e®ects on in°ation may be more permanent
(Alesina 1988, Alesina-Sachs 1988, Alesina-Rosenthal 1995, Alesina-Roubini-Cohen 1997). There
is also evidence that the magnitude of these partisan e®ects is related to the degree to which the
election outcome was a surprise (Cohen 1993, Alesina-Roubini-Cohen 1997).
There exist two main theories to explain these facts: the traditional partisan theory (Hibbs
1977) and the rational partisan theory (Alesina 1987). The traditional partisan theory (PT) relies
on adaptive in°ation expectations to generate a relatively stable short-run Phillips curve. The
partisan policy-maker then chooses his party's preferred point on the Phillips curve. To the extent
that parties prefer di®erent points on the Phillips curve, the result is partisan di®erences in economic
performance. The duration of the partisan e®ects is governed by the speed with which expectations
adjust.
The rational partisan theory (RPT) is based on an expectations-augmented Phillips curve de-
rived from a simple wage-contract framework. Output growth, yt, is assumed to be inversely related
to the growth in real wages, wt ¡ ¼t, so that yt = ¹ y ¡ [wt ¡ ¼t] where ¹ y is the natural rate of out-
put growth and lower case letters indicate logarithmic growth rates. In equilibrium, the growth
of nominal wages, wt, is set equal to the in°ation rate, ¼t, to clear the competitive labor market.
However, it is assumed that wage contracts must be negotiated before actual in°ation is revealed
so it is to expected in°ation that nominal wage growth is equated as unions and employers attempt
to keep real wages consistent with full employment. Thus wt = ¼e
t.
In°ation expectations are forward-looking and rational and thus only unexpected aggregate
demand shocks a®ect output. An election serves as such a shock. On the eve of an election, it is
uncertain which party will be in power next year. As a result, rational in°ation expectations are an
average of the preferred in°ation policies of the parties weighted by the probabilities of each party
being elected. When the election takes place, there is a sudden resolution of this uncertainty as a
winner is produced and the party (and associated economic policy) in power next year is identi¯ed.
But wage contracts are ¯xed in the short term and can adjust to this change only with a lag. Thus
in the period immediately after the new administration takes o±ce, there is a gap between nominal
wage growth and the new in°ation policy|in e®ect a surprise in°ation or de°ation|leading to an
expansion or contraction in the economy. This delivers partisan di®erences in economic performance
which endure until wage and price contracts are renegotiated to re°ect the new information.
Both Hibbs and Alesina based their work on macroeconomic models featuring a Phillips curve
and reduced the di®erences between left and right to di®erent points on that Phillips curve (di®erent
weights on output and in°ation in the loss function of the elected policy authority). Their macro-
models typically assumed government was a unitary actor such that the elected o±cial controlled the
sole policy variable (typically direct control over the price level). However, the current literature on
macro-economic policy recognizes the importance of strategic interplay between the elected o±cials
in control of ¯scal policy and the appointed|and ostensibly independent|o±cials in control of
4monetary policy.
Furthermore, the traditional view of the left and right as di®ering mainly in their preferences
over output and in°ation is better suited to a model of monetary policy, which is purely a matter
of aggregate demand stimulus, than ¯scal and regulatory policy, which are more complex. The
purview of the ¯scal policy authority includes spending and subsidies but also includes regulation
concerning the source and magnitude of pension and health-care contributions, employment termi-
nation, replacement rates for the unemployed, the mix of personal and corporate taxes, the degree
of progressivity in the income tax code, and a host of other policies with e®ects not captured by the
classic tradeo® between unemployment and in°ation. The issue is not simply the degree of ¯scal
stimulus but the distribution of net burdens of taxes and transfers, the direction of investment in
public goods, and the design of market regulations.
For example, these models of monetary policy typically assume output and employment move
together and refer to them interchangably. This may be broadly true in that output and employment
may move together in response to aggregate demand stimulus. But distributive and regulatory
policy can decouple output and employment. To the extent that parties di®er in these areas,
politically induced macroeconomic volatility will not simply be an oscillation along the short-run
Phillips curve.
There is also reason to believe that partisan di®erences, and hence politically induced macroeco-
nomic volatility, vary by country. The left-right dichotomy originates from the seating arrangement
in the ¯rst elected French Legislative Assembly of 1791 and was based on support for or opposition
to the ancien regime, the dominant political issue of that particular time and place. Over time,
the left-right terminology has been exported to a variety of polities and the salient issues in these
polities have evolved. As a result, left and right have come to cover a host of di®erent ideological
di®erences: big government vs. limited government, intervention vs. laissez faire, redistribution
vs. free market, equality vs. liberty, fair outcomes vs. fair processes, religion vs. secularism, collec-
tivism vs. individualism. Broad application of the labels left and right has created the illusion of
standardized political debate where, in fact, political cleavages are a function of the environment
and thus vibrantly heterogeneous.
Conceptually, the space of ¯scal and regulatory policies is multi-dimensional and the primary po-
litical axis di®erentiating the dominant parties is endogenous. Citizens' preferences are distributed
in a multi-dimensional policy-space and parties choose positions to represent citizens. Ideologically,
one would expect the major left-right axis to be the principle component of the underlying variation
of preferences in the polity. As these preferences shift so does the partisan axis. Salient partisan
di®erences must be a function of the local environment.
As a matter of practical policy, challenges for economic policy and the array of possible so-
lutions are naturally a function of the institutional environment within which alternate policies
must operate. For example, the persistence of high unemployment in European countries is often
attributed to in°exible labor laws governing the hiring and ¯ring of workers suggesting that relax-
ing restrictions might lead to lower unemployment. As changing these laws has consequences for
distribution and social justice, citizens, and thus political parties, di®er in their support for the
proposal. Generally, right parties have supported this solution to the unemployment problem while
left parties have proposed a reduction in the work-week to spread the \lump of labor" across a
greater number of people. In this case, the existing labor-market institution frames the issue and
suggests a policy prescription with a particular set of distributional consequences. As a result, the
existing labor market institution helps to de¯ne the partisan cleavage in these countries. Notice
that in the United States, no such debate exists. The US possesses a di®erent set of labor market
5institutions and thus faces a di®erent set of policy challenges and a di®erent set of possible solu-
tions. The partisan cleavage in the US does not include this particular dimension. To the extent
that policies must be incremental changes to the organization of the economy, existing institutions
de¯ne the comprehensible policy alternatives and feasible macroeconomic tradeo®s and thus de¯ne
the partisan di®erences over economic policy.
Williamson (1985) and North (1990) have championed the idea that institutions|both ¯rms
and those governing intra-¯rm relationships|are a path-dependent social technology that evolves
to reduce transactions costs of complex economic interactions. As a result of the path-dependent
nature of institutional evolution, multiple systems may coexist. The literature on `varieties of
capitalism' emphasizes the systematic and persistent di®erences in the institutional organization
of national economies. In particular, Hall and Soskice (2001), argue that complementarities be-
tween institutions of corporate governance, corporate ¯nance, education and vocational training,
wage bargaining, employment protection, technological standard setting, and technological trans-
fer lead nations to cluster into two or three varieties of capitalism. In liberal market economies
(LMEs), economic activity tends to be organized around arms-length transactions in competi-
tive, decentralized markets with formal contracting. In coordinated market economies (CMEs),
economic activity tends to take place via repeated collaborative relationships with informal con-
tracting and network monitoring based on the exchange of private information. Mediterranean
market economies (MMEs) represent a third cluster with \capacities for non-market coordination
in the sphere of corporate ¯nance and more liberal arrangements in the sphere of labor relations."
Given the importance of institutions in framing policy issues and suggesting solutions with par-
ticular distributional and ideological consequences, one would expect economies with such broadly
di®erent institutional bases to be characterized by di®erent political cleavages and, as a result, by
di®erent partisan political business cycles.
As I will show, there are three broad patterns in the response of forecasters to partisan surprise
corresponding to the three varieties of capitalism de¯ned by Hall and Soskice. In one set of countries
(France, Italy, Spain), the left is expected to deliver higher output growth and lower unemployment
than the right with higher short-term interest rates, but at the cost of higher in°ation. This is the
traditional partisan political business cycle. In another set of countries (US, UK, Canada), the left
is expected to deliver higher output growth than the right with higher short and long-term interest
rates but no e®ect on unemployment and in°ation|a relative boom for free. And in the third set of
countries (Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden), the left is associated with lower output
growth and lower interest rates|a relative bust|and with higher unemployment and higher in°a-
tion. The left is simply seen as less competent in general or as trading macroeconomic performance
for other goals. These results indicate that politically induced macro-economic volatility is neither
homogeneous across countries nor simply the result of oscillations along a SR Phillips curve.
3 Estimating Partisan Cycles
Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997) attempt to di®erentiate between the traditional and the rational
partisan mechanisms by looking at the duration of the partisan e®ects. They claim that while RPT
predicts temporary e®ects, the traditional theory results in permanent partisan di®erences over the
entire term of o±ce. In a panel of 18 OECD democracies covering 1960-1993, they ¯nd partisan
di®erences in growth and unemployment are con¯ned to the ¯rst year or two after the election
while partisan di®erences in in°ation persist throughout the entire term of government. While this
work is valuable in documenting the behavior of the partisan political business cycle, it does not
6satisfactorily establish the mechanism.
Essentially, both theories predict transitory e®ects in output growth and unemployment, albeit
with di®erent mechanisms governing the duration of the partisan e®ect. Alesina, Roubini, and
Cohen (ARC) indicate that partisan e®ects decay within two years. They contend this is consistent
with wage-contracts with an average length of 1-2 years. However, it is also consistent with adaptive
expectations that adjust su±ciently rapidly. The parameter values are plausible either way so it is
di±cult to convincingly reject either theory with a measurement of the cycle's length.
Furthermore, it seems likely that both mechanisms are simultaneously at work. Large ¯rms
with independent forecasting departments to inform investment, R&D, pricing, and production
decisions might accurately be characterized by forward-looking expectations. The mom-and-pop
grocery store on the corner is probably more adaptive, setting prices based on observation of recent
changes in input prices rather than sophisticated projection of aggregate supply and demand from
recent events. Other wage and price setters probably distribute on a continuum from those who
incorporate relevant public information and project future states nearly as quickly and completely
as professional forecasters to those who react mainly to recent, proximate changes in prices. This
is essentially the spirit of recent models built on time-contingent price-adjustment (Mankiw-Reis
(2002), Woodford (2002))
Since PT and RPT are both formulated to explain observed partisan political business cycles,
any test based on the cycle itself is likely to su®er from low power. But the mechanisms require very
di®erent behavior of expectations. Under RPT, the resolution of electoral uncertainty acts as an
unexpected shock to aggregate demand: it is the information revealed on Election Day that drives
the partisan political business cycle. In PT, by contrast, information revealed on Election Day goes
unremarked: expectations adjust only gradually as the policy of the new administration is revealed
through the performance of the economy. These two sources of expectations changes operate on
very di®erent time scales. Thus to distinguish between them, we ought to look at the behavior of
expectations in the neighborhood of the election. Under RPT, an election should trigger a sharp
change in expectations. Under PT it will not.
However, characterizing the relative importance of Hibbs' and Alesina's mechanisms would
require a broad set of macroeconomic expectations capturing the range of sophistication from Ford
Motor Company to the corner market. Unfortunately, expectations data is relatively new and hard
to come by. Systematic recordings of professional forecasters' expectations for a broad range of
countries and variables are fewer than 20 years old. Data for the rest of the spectrum of wage
and price setters remains almost non-existent. A systematic exploration of the entire spectrum
must therefore be the subject of future work.1 In this paper I look solely at the expectations of
professional forecasters: presumably the rational, forward-looking end of the spectrum. Focusing
solely on the expectations of professional forecasters isolates the rational partisan mechanism.
This enables an investigation of how the most attentive forecasters perceive the e®ective economic
di®erences between the policies of the left and right and how and why this perceived di®erence varies
across countries. Along the way I will establish the e±ciency with which these forecasters process
political information to ensure that these forecasts actually represent forward-looking agents in the
sense captured by RPT.
Figure 2 shows how forward-looking expectations respond to the information revealed in an
1See Mankiw, Reis, Wolfers (2003) for a comparison of popular and professional in°ation forecasts in the US.
They use the Michigan Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behaviors which includes a direct question about in°ation
forecasts in a survey of ordinary citizens. To my knowledge, this kind of data is relatively unique. It is unfortunately
































Forecasts in Levels First-Di®erence of Forecast
Figure 2: The Behavior of Forward-Looking Forecasts Near an Election. (At Left) The pre-election
forecast is a weighted average of the forecasts under alternative election results. The weights are given
by the ex-ante probabilities of each party winning. In this example, a left-party victory is more likely.
(At Right) Taking the ¯rst di®erence of the forecasts, we expect to see a discrete change at election time
when the information is revealed, followed by a return to stability. The direction of the change depends
on the identity of the victorious party. The magnitude of the change depends on the degree to which
that victory was unexpected.
election and motivates the central measurement of this paper. Imagine an election in year t which
will determine which party is in power (and thus which ¯scal policy is implemented) in the following
year, t+1. Assume that the left and right-wing political alternatives espouse di®erent ¯scal policies
with di®erent consequences for a macroeconomic variable of interest such as in°ation. To the
extent that parties can credibly commit to policies before the election and forecasters can predict
the implications of these policies, this implies the forecast of year t+1 in°ation depends on which
party wins the election. Of course, only one of these forecasts is actually observed, the other is
counter-factual.
Meanwhile, pre-election in°ation expectations are an average of the two in°ation levels that
would prevail under the alternate policies of the left and right weighted by the probability of each
party actually winning the election. Once Election Day results are revealed, expectations change
discontinuously to match the new policy. The more surprising the election result, the further the
forecasts must shift. Similarly, the greater the distance between the policies of the left and right,
the larger the shift. By measuring the degree to which the election was a surprise and the response
of forecasts to that surprise, we can infer the perceived distance between the levels of in°ation
under the ¯scal policies of the left and right. And by doing this for a variety of macroeconomic
indicators we get a broad picture of the perceived di®erence between the ¯scal policies of the left
and right.
The measurement at the center of this paper is a set of simple regressions of the change in
economic forecasts on the change in the political forecast. The question is: what connection does the
existing theory on ¯scal policy suggest? Consider Barro and Gordon's (1983) neo-classical treatment
of discretion and commitment in monetary policy. A unitary policy-maker facing demand shocks,
8²t, chooses in°ation directly to minimize the following loss function subject to an expectations-
augmented Phillips curve.
Lt = (Ut ¡ ~ U)2 + µ(¼t ¡ ~ ¼)2
Resulting in equilibrium levels of in°ation (¼¤) and unemployment (U¤)
Ut = ¡(¼t ¡ ¼e
t) + ²t
¼e¤
















Partisan policy is parameterized by the triple (~ ¼; ~ U;µ), where (~ U; ~ ¼) is the government's ideal
point in unemployment-in°ation space and µ is the relative weight given to in°ation relative to
output in the loss function. The assumption is that liberal governments tend to have lower µ
and/or lower ~ U and higher ~ ¼ than conservative governments. Political surprise is therefore an
unexpected shift from (~ ¼; ~ U;µ) to (~ ¼0; ~ U0;µ0) resulting in an unanticipated shift in monetary policy.
As a result of a political surprise in period t, unemployment is temporarily di®erent than the natural
rate for period t, in°ation adjusts in period t+1, bringing unemployment back to the natural rate
in t+1. Output is assumed to move counter to unemployment. Liberal (conservative) surprise,
in the form of lower (higher) µ, delivers a one period drop (rise) in unemployment followed by an
increase (decrease) in in°ation.
Hence the prediction under this model depends on the horizon of the forecasts. A short forecast
horizon should pick up an e®ect on unemployment and output but little e®ect on in°ation while a
longer horizon would pick up little e®ect on unemployment and output but an e®ect on in°ation.
To the extent that liberal governments care more about output than in°ation, we expect lower
unemployment, higher output growth, and higher in°ation following liberal surprise, with the
magnitude depending on the length of the forecast horizon compared to the speed with which
prices adjust.
4 Two New Data Sets
I have obtained a panel of data recording forecasts of seven macroeconomic variables for eleven
OECD countries from 1989-2004. I have also collected opinion poll data for the 36 elections in the
countries and years covered by the forecast data. Comparing pre-election opinion polls|on which
forecasters are assumed to base their political projections|to election results quanti¯es the degree
to which the election result is a surprise. To my knowledge, this is the ¯rst study of election-induced
macroeconomic volatility using expectations data. It is also one of a small number of studies which
controls for the magnitude of election surprise.2 Matching these unique data sets, I regress the post-
electoral change in economic forecasts on the election results to measure the anticipated di®erence
2Earlier studies using poll data include Chappell-Keech (1988), ARC (1997), Heckelman (2002), and Berleman-
Markwardt (2003). In their chapter 5, ARC use option-pricing techniques to convert pre-election poll data for the
9Table 1: Number of Panelists per Survey, By Country
Country Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Canada 2674 15.1 2.0 11 20
France 3111 16.1 3.6 6 24
Germany 4721 25.4 3.1 12 32
Italy 2308 12.9 2.8 6 21
Japan 3489 15.7 4.0 5 23
Netherlands 1060 9.3 1.6 7 14
Norway 731 10.1 1.4 6 12
Spain 1489 12.3 2.0 7 17
Sweden 1419 12.5 2.2 6 17
UK 5354 30.4 4.7 18 39
USA 4606 25.0 3.4 16 33
Only panelists that have recorded a forecast for
consumer price in°ation are counted in this table.
between the policies of the left and the right. By looking at forecasts of several macroeconomic
variables, I ¯nd that (a) forecasters respond strongly and swiftly to the information content of
elections, (b) the perceived di®erence is more complex than an unemployment-in°ation tradeo®
and (c) the di®erence varies by country, with coordinated market economies exhibiting a markedly
di®erent policy cleavage than liberal market economies.
4.1 A Panel of Economic Forecasts
To measure economic forecasts, I employ forecast data from Consensus Economics. The data
consist of monthly surveys covering eleven countries|Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the US|from October 1989 to July 2004.3
For each country-month, the survey records individual forecasts on a number of macroeconomic
variables by a number of panelists, typically commercial and investment banks, large ¯rms, and
think tanks. The exact number of panelists, the depth of the survey, varies by country and month.
Individual panelists are identi¯ed and can be tracked through the data. The duration of their stay
in the sample varies by panelist: some panelists are in the sample consistently for years, others
regularly miss a few surveys a year, and some simply make a brief one or two month appearance.
Table 1 summarizes the number of panelists per country. The variables for which forecasts are
formed for all countries include output growth, the growth of private consumption, the growth of
business investment, consumer price in°ation, 90-day interest rates, and 10-year bond yields. For
the G7, forecasts are also made on the level of unemployment. Producer price in°ation, the level
of exports and imports, and the trade balance are also widely available while housing starts and
auto sales are included for a few countries. Individual panelists do not necessarily deliver forecasts
for every variable included in a country survey. Nonetheless, for the seven variables mentioned in
the ¯rst two lists, which will form the core of this study, the response rate is extremely high.
Two aspects of this data are particularly exciting. First, the high frequency not only increases
US into election probabilities giving a more sophisticated measure of surprise. But in the rest of their book, they
concentrate only on elections resulting in a change in government partisanship (left to right or vice versa). This is
akin to assuming that the incumbent party is expected to win with certainty and thus elections where the incumbent
wins generate zero surprise while those where the incumbent loses generate full surprise.
3The G7 are in the sample from the beginning; other countries have been added later. Norway was added to the
sample in June 1998 while Spain, Netherlands, and Sweden were added in January 1995. Switzerland is part of the
survey since June 1998 but has been dropped from this study due to di±culty ¯nding Swiss poll data.
10Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Iqr
Output growth (y) 29925 2.44 0.87 -2.2 6.2 1.0
Consumption growth (c) 29809 2.30 0.92 -2.5 6.3 1.1
Investment growth (i) 29551 4.40 3.13 -14.7 20.6 3.5
Unemployment (u) 24103 7.68 2.75 0.6 14.0 4.5
Consumer Price In°ation (cp) 29851 2.43 1.27 -1.7 10.4 1.3
3-month rates (sr) 28278 5.09 2.65 0.0 15.5 2.1
10-year yield (lr) 27744 6.25 2.12 0.3 14.7 3.5
¢y 29181 -0.03 0.33 -4.8 4.3 0.1
¢c 29036 -0.02 0.35 -4.7 4.6 0.0
¢i 28692 -0.08 1.34 -21.3 17.1 0.2
¢u 23351 0.01 0.27 -3.0 4.4 0.0
¢cp 29046 -0.02 0.27 -4.8 3.9 0.1
¢sr 26893 -0.04 0.41 -5.1 5.4 0.3
¢lr 26285 -0.03 0.35 -4.6 3.0 0.3
SURPRISE > 0 9 0.27 0.38 0.02 1.00
SURPRISE = 0 16 0 0 0 0
SURPRISE < 0 9 -0.25 0.28 -0.96 -0.04
¢» refers to the one month change in variable ».
IQR refers to the inter-quartile range: the di®erence between the 25th and
75th percentiles.
the number of observations but enables one to measure the high frequency responses to events that
are likely to characterize expectations. A look at the summary statistics in table 2 shows that
expectations are often stable but are also capable of large changes in a single month. The ¢»
variables are the ¯rst di®erence of a panelist's forecasts of variable ». The sample average for these
¯rst-di®erences is close to zero and the inter-quartile range is usually quite small. However, the
standard deviation is large. This suggests that individual panelists adjust infrequently|perhaps
every few months on average|but that such adjustments can be large and swift. Although many
observations bring no adjustment, this does not necessarily imply infrequent updating of informa-
tion or rule out rapid responses to events. High frequency data allows a more precise examination
of the timing of panelists' responses to events and information.
The other exciting aspect of the data is the existence of multiple panelists per country. If each
panelist is endowed with an information set and a forecasting model, then having multiple panelists
is like a repeated experiment with multiple draws of information set and forecasting model. This
increases the variation in the dataset and increases con¯dence in the generality of the results so long
as the forecasts display independent variation. For each variable, I calculate the average pairwise
correlation between the forecasts of two panelists located in the same country. This gives a measure
of how much independent variation exists among di®erent panelists' forecasts of the same variable.
I then repeat the exercise for the ¯rst di®erence of each variable, which speaks to the cohesion in
the sample over the short-run. The average pairwise correlation in output growth forecasts ranges
between .44 and .68 which seems quite low given the forecasters are observing the same country.
This suggests that panelists are endowed with signi¯cantly di®erent information sets and/or employ
a variety of forecasting models. The average pairwise correlation of the month-to-month change
in the forecast of output growth is much lower, ranging from .15 to .34. This indicates that the
direction in which one panelist's forecast moves tells relatively little about the direction in which
the forecast of another panelist (in the same country) will move. This is further information that
11Table 3: Average Pairwise Correlation of Fore-













¢y refers to the one month change in y
panelists either focus on di®erent sets of information or carry di®erent interpretations of what
that information means for future output growth. Thus the data indicate that panelists bring
signi¯cantly di®erent information to the sample, tend to move in di®erent directions in the short-
run, and tend to adjust every few periods rather than every month. Not all horses in the stable look
alike. What I will show is that despite this evidence of forecaster heterogeneity, elections spook the
herd to move strongly in a certain direction.
For each variable, there are two forecast horizons: the current calendar year (current-year) and
the following calendar year (year-ahead). This means that the forecast horizon is not actually a
¯xed distance from the date of the survey, but comes closer as the end of the year approaches and
then leaps ahead again as the new calendar year is reached. For example, in the March 1996 survey,
panelists record their forecasts for output growth for the 1996 calendar year and output growth for
the 1997 calendar year. In the December 1996 survey, they record forecasts of output growth for
the 1996 calendar year (which is all but over) and the 1997 calendar year. Then, in the January
1997 survey, panelists record forecasts for output growth over the 1997 calendar year and the 1998
calendar year. Clearly, as the year passes, the forecast horizons move closer to the survey date. As
a result, forecasts for the current calendar year tend to become more tightly clustered toward the
end of the year as the bulk of the uncertainty is resolved.4 This e®ect is also seen in the year-ahead
data series, but is much weaker since the entire period with which the forecast is concerned remains
in the future.
The central regression in this paper, equation (6), uses the ¯rst di®erence of a panelist's forecasts,
¢»e
t. However, if one were to blindly take the ¯rst di®erence of either the current year or the year-
ahead data series, one would end up with data displaying spurious seasonality. Imagine that one
is interested in using the year-ahead data to calculate a 2-month measurement window for the
variable ». Thus ¢»e
t = »e
t+2¡»e
t. This generates a consistent data series for the months of January
through October: in each case the forecast horizon is two months nearer on the far side of the
measurement window than it is on the near side. For example, in April of 1992, we are taking the
di®erence between »e
June1992, when the forecast horizon is 18 months distant, and »e
April1992, when
the forecast horizon is 20 months distant. However, because the forecast horizon is tied to the
calendar year, this causes a problem for December 1992. Now we are di®erencing a forecast for
4For the 90-day interest rate and the 10-year bond yield the forecast horizons are ¯xed at 3 months and 12 months
ahead rather than being tied to the calendar year and thus do not exhibit this e®ect. For these variables I use the
twelve month horizon.
12calendar year 1994 from a forecast for calendar year 1993: this is comparing apples and oranges.
So we must use some of the data from the shorter forecast horizon, the current year data, to ensure
a smooth data series. In the end, the forecast horizon on the far edge of the measurement window
varies from 10-21 months depending on the time of year, but the di®erence in horizon between the
leading and trailing edges of the measurement window is always 2-months.
4.2 Pre-Electoral Poll Data
To measure the extent of the surprise contained in the election result requires a measure of the
ex-ante expected election outcome. The natural place to look is polling data. Hibbs suggested using
electoral preference polls ¯fteen years ago in his review article (Hibbs 1992) and several years prior,
Chappell and Keech did so in their study of US unemployment (Chappell-Keech 1988). In recent
years, interest in the e®ect of endogenous elections on the partisan theory has led a few authors
to pursue time series poll data of party preference for other developed countries. Unfortunately,
reliable time series poll data have proven di±cult to acquire. The number of countries in those few
studies that utilize poll data is quite small compared to typical cross-country studies of political
business cycles which usually feature at least a dozen countries and sometimes as many as one
hundred. Heckelman (2002) studies Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom, chosen \because
of the availability of continuous poll data". Berleman and Markwardt (2003) manage to assemble
data for six countries (Australia, France, Germany, Sweden, the UK, and the US) from a variety
of sources. Because there is no central source of poll data, ¯nding reliable time-series data for a
lengthy period covering multiple elections is a challenge which must be revisited for each country
in the study with no guarantee of compatibility.
Luckily, as I study information revealed in a short period around the election date, I do not
need time series poll data. For my purposes, it is su±cient to measure the probability of either
side achieving victory at the time when the pre-electoral economic forecasts are recorded: one-
two months prior to the election. Comparing this probability to the actual election result gives a
measure of the electoral surprise realized over the measurement window. Thus electoral surprise
and the change in expectations are measured across the same window.
While pre-electoral poll data exists for many countries, it has not, to my knowledge, been
compiled before. The appendix documents the sources from which I have compiled my pre-electoral
polling data. The data are based on in-person or telephone interviews featuring the question: \If
a fgeneral, parliamentary, presidentialg election were held ftomorrow, Sundayg, which fparty,
candidateg would you vote for?" The raw data yield the frequency with which each candidate or
party garnered support as well as frequencies of respondents who are uncertain. For each party
i, I have de¯ned vi as the percentage of survey respondents who expressed an intention to vote
for party i. Many polls repeat the question for those who express uncertainty, asking them \Are
you leaning toward any particular party?" I have not counted these separate respondents, focusing
solely on voters who profess to have made their decision. To form the ¯nal vr (vl) I have summed
the vi of all right (left)-wing parties which garner at least 5% of the votes in the election. I use the
Mannheim Eurobarometer de¯nitions of which parties belong to the left and right.
The data have been collected from three di®erent types of sources: general election studies, pub-
lic opinion polls by public opinion agencies, and opinion polls by major newspapers. My preferred
source was general election studies. The goal is to gain a measure of pre-electoral political support
at the front edge of the measurement window. Thus I selected the general election study if available
and conducted fewer than three months prior to the election. If this was unavailable, I simply chose
the most prominent opinion poll available during that period, either from a public opinion agency,
13or a major newspaper (whose polls are usually conducted by public opinion agencies). All of the
polls are scienti¯c and feature at least one thousand respondents selected to represent the national
electorate (no regional polls, no respondents ineligible to vote, no internet polls). In two cases
(Italy 1994, Spain 1996), I could ¯nd no poll data so these have been coded missing. The sources
for each election and the dates over which the ¯eld work for the polls were done are noted in the
appendix.
Macroeconomic data for the eleven countries have been gathered from the IMF and the EIU.
All data is monthly with the exception of data on GDP growth which is quarterly.
5 The Construction of Key Variables
5.1 A Measure of Political Surprise
Data on election dates and outcomes have been assembled using Banks' Political Handbook of the
World plus various National Election Institutes and include the date of the election, the vote shares
of and seats allocated to each party, and the ideology of the post-electoral government. The poll
data are used in conjunction with data on the election outcome to produce SURPRISE, the variable
measuring the partisan political surprise from an election. Its magnitude measures the extent of
the electoral surprise; its sign indicates the partisan a±liation of the victorious government.
The ¯rst step in the construction of SURPRISE is to classify, using Banks' Political Handbook
of the World, the ¯nal government produced by each election on a ¯ve-point scale from left to right
GOV =
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Single party governments earn a pure left or right classi¯cation while coalitions encompassing
parties with di®ering economic ideologies earn a diluted center-left, center-right, or even dead-center
classi¯cation.
The next step is to determine which alternative governments the election is to decide between.
For the United States, the alternatives are a Democratic president (GOV=1) or a Republican
president (GOV=0). Similarly, for Britain the alternatives are a Labor government (GOV=1) or
a Conservative government (GOV=0). But for Japan, the relevant electoral question during this
era is not whether the LDP heads the government, but whether the LDP must form a coalition
government which dilutes its policies (GOV=0.25), or whether it can poll a majority (GOV=0).
Similarly, in the Canadian general elections of 1993, 1997, and 2000, support for the Liberal party
was so overwhelming that the important electoral margin was not between pure left and pure right,
but between pure left (GOV=1) and center-left (GOV=0.75). Finally, in multiple Dutch elections
(1998, 2002, and 2003), three parties of roughly equal size implied that neither left nor right would
obtain a majority. Thus in this case the alternatives were center-left (GOV=0.75) and center-right
(GOV=0.25). Excepting these three countries, the alternatives are taken to be left-wing majority
(GOV=1) and right-wing majority (GOV=0).
Having established the likely alternatives, the task is to assign ex-ante probabilities to these
alternatives, or rather, to the probability that the more conservative alternative is realized on
14Election Day. This probability is generated using pre-electoral opinion poll data.5 Think of an
opinion poll as a repeated draw from a trinomial distribution (voter prefers party R, party L,
or some other party) with unknown parameters qr and ql which indicate the probability a given
respondent prefers party R or party L. If vi denotes the vote-share party i receives in pre-electoral
opinion polls and N is the size of the poll, then for large N, the di®erence vi ¡ vj is normally













Then the probability that qr > ql and thus the right wing party will win Election Day given







where © is the cumulative standard normal distribution.67
This method works for the cases where the important margin is competition between two parties.
For those elections (Japan 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2003 and Canada 1993, 1997, 2000) where the
electoral uncertainty concerns whether a single party i can win a majority of the seats, the standard















The sole complication arises from the disconnect between vote share and seat share. While poll
data measures expected vote share, parliamentary governments rely on support from a majority of
seats. The well-known phenomenon is that small parties tend to garner a non-negligible fraction of
the national vote, but are unable to muster a majority in a corresponding fraction of the districts
and so fail to win seats commensurate with their vote share. Simply omitting parties which fail
to poll 5% of the vote and renormalizing the remaining parties brings vote share and seat share
broadly in line. Thus vote shares v0
i in equations (3) and (4) have been adjusted by omitting parties
supported by less than 5% of the respondents.
The ¯nal value of SURPRISE is given by
SURPRISEct = Gct ¡ Lct ¡ (Rct ¡ Lct)Pct (5)
5It is frequently argued that pre-election polls are unreliable predictors of election results. Recall, however, that
for this study, we are not looking for an accurate predictor, but rather for a measure of forecasters pre-election
expectations of the political results. So pre-election opinion polls need not be perfect predictors of the ¯nal outcome,
they simply need to be the political predictors o® which forecasters base their economic forecasts. This is a weaker
constraint and one which, given the centrality of opinion polls in public debate and among the punditry, I ¯nd
acceptable.
6The opinion polls I use range in size from 1000 to 9000 respondants.
7This formulation focuses only on sampling error. I have worked out a more complicated model in which surveys
may also mis-estimate the relative turnout between parties. Estimating such a model gives broadly similar results.
15where Gct is the value of the ¯nal government on the ¯ve point GOV scale following the election
in country c at time t, Lct and Rct are the values of the left and right alternatives on that same
scale, and Pct is the probability from equation (2) or (4). Each of these steps can be viewed in light
of Figure 3. Classifying the alternatives at stake in the election (Rct and Lct) on the ¯ve point
GOV scale is akin to measuring the distance between the liberal and conservative alternatives.8
Converting poll data to the expected probability of a conservative victory (Pct) and then scaling by
the distance between the two alternatives (Rct¡Lct) gives a measure of the pre-election expectation.
Subtracting this from the resulting government (Gct) yields a measure of the degree to which the
ex-post election result di®ered from the ex-ante expectation.
The sample consists of 36 elections.9 Changes of power not associated with elections have been
omitted due to the di±culty in obtaining measures of political surprise which are consistent with
the surprise contained in the elections.10 The sample is well-balanced between the left and right:
17 left-wing governments, 15 right-wing governments, and 2 centrist coalitions. Most governments
are given a pure left or right designation, only 4 out of 36 earn center-left, center-right, or dead
center classi¯cations.
Summary statistics for SURPRISE are included in table 2. There are 16 elections for which
the results generated negligible SURPRISE, 9 results generating positive (liberal) SURPRISE and
9 results generating negative (conservative) SURPRISE. The average absolute value of SURPRISE
during the non-negligible elections is roughly 0.25. The largest absolute values come from US 2000
and Spain 2004 which accords well with qualitative accounts of these elections. For windows that
do not contain an election, SURPRISE takes a value of zero.
This method for constructing ex-ante expectations makes two implicit assumptions. First, that
polls re°ect the fundamental preferences of the electorate modulo sampling error. Second, that the
fundamental preferences of the electorate are relatively stable between the poll and the election and
thus the extent of the ex-ante uncertainty in the outcome is given by the sample error of the poll.
Wlezien and Eriksson (2002) have conducted a careful study of the time-series behavior of polls in
US Presidential elections from 1948 to 2000. They ¯nd that the party conventions seem to mark
an important dividing line between early and late campaigns; each of which is characterized by
distinctive behavior. During the early campaign (100-200 days preceding the election), campaign
shocks are large but temporary. News can have a large e®ect on voters' preferences but is forgotten
by Election Day. Polls are highly volatile but most of this is due to transient shocks and survey
error. Because voters tend to eventually forgive and forget, fundamental preferences are essentially
a stationary time-series. During the late campaign (the ¯nal 100 days preceding election), cam-
paign shocks are smaller but do not completely dissipate before Election Day. Preferences are an
integrated series. However, the shocks, though permanent, are much smaller in magnitude. Hence
any given poll conducted during the late campaign is a much better predictor of the ¯nal results
8One commonly raised objection is that this method imposes a uniform left-right scale on all countries when clearly
the right in England-Tony Blair-is rather di®erent from the right in the United States-George Bush-and quite possibly
less conservative on many issues than the American left. While this is true, it is not relevant to the measurement
at hand. SURPRISE is based on the di®erence between the left and right in a particular country. Heterogeneity in
the median of the national political spectrum washes out when this ¯rst di®erence is taken. On the other hand, the
extent to which countries di®er in the degree of polarization-the distance between the left and right-is suppressed by
the common scale. There are, however, two mitigating factors. First, Center-Right and Center-Left classi¯cations
address the coarsest di®erences across countries. Second, the grouping of countries by variety of capitalism presumably
mitigates the problem further as political systems are likely to be more similar within a group than across them.
9In most countries I have chosen legislative elections for the lower house. In the United States, the only presidential
country in the data set, I look at presidential elections. This is consistent with ARC and other authors.
10For an attempt to combine both latent and electoral surprise, see Berlemann and Markwardt 2003.
16than one taken during the early campaign. A simple linear regression of vote-division on poll results
delivers an adjusted-R2 of 0.7 for polls 60 days prior to the election, rising to 0.85 on the eve of the
election.
Their results con¯rm that poll data are tightly tied to fundamental preferences, especially during
the late campaign, and thus constitute an appropriate measure of ex-ante political expectations.
They further suggest that some portion of the measurement error in a poll is due to the fact
that fundamental preferences will move between the date of the poll and Election Day. The rest,
and they emphasize that this remains the larger part, especially during the later period, is due
to sampling. This additional source of uncertainty over the poll results-changes in fundamental
preferences as well as survey error-means my method overestimates the likelihood of the favored
party winning. As a result, when the favored party does win, SURPRISE is an under-estimate
of the changes in expectations a rational poll-watching agent would feel, but when the favored
party loses, SURPRISE is an over-estimate. Wlezien and Eriksson do emphasize that during the
late campaign period these movements, and thus the source of error, are small. However, it is not
clear in what direction this measurement error in°uences my coe±cient estimates. Addressing this
source of (unknown) bias would require more detailed time-series poll data and has thus been left
for future work.
As Wlezien and Eriksson study only US Presidential elections, generalizing their insights to a
study of multiple countries with a variety of electoral systems and traditions requires caution. In
particular, the 100 day cuto® between the early campaign, when voters are open-minded but less
attentive, and the late campaign, when the reverse is true, is probably a result of the particular
timing and structure of US Presidential elections. Wlezien and Eriksson postulate that party
conventions may instigate the shift from the ¯rst regime to the second by prompting voters to pay
consistent attention. Nonetheless, it is not hard to believe|though evidence does not yet exist|
that electorates in general exhibit some kind of transition from a period in which fundamental
preferences are volatile but stationary to one in which preferences are integrated but display much
lower volatility.
Wlezien and Eriksson's results highlight the importance of keeping my narrow measurement
window so as to minimize this source of measurement error. Their categorization of di®erent
periods of campaign behavior further highlights the importance of ensuring that the ex-ante poll is
taken during the period of \late campaign" behavior when polls more closely align with fundamental
preferences.
5.2 The Event Window
Because the dependent variable is the change in forecasts, it is necessary to choose over how many
months to measure that change. Uncertainty over the future ¯scal policy is not resolved solely on
Election Day: it may be resolved during the campaign as one party dominates the polls, or persist
beyond the vote due to the post-election process of forming a governing coalition. The pattern
of resolution is unique to an election. My purpose is to focus solely on elections as large and
rapid changes in political forecast which are (relatively) easily measured. I focus on the election
and formation of the governing coalition and leave aside the ups and downs of the campaign. I
have chosen a two-month window in order to capture both the election and the formation of the
governing coalition. This means that the dependent variable in a given month is the change in the
forecast between the current survey and the survey two months previous. 11
11Rerunning the regressions with one and three month windows show the importance of post-election coalition
formation. A three month window gives similar point estimates but larger standard errors indicating the larger
17Using a two-month window generates autocorrelation in the LHS variable. If the LHS variable is
the di®erence in the level of »t across the past two months, but is recorded with monthly frequency,
then these windows overlap. This means any particular month-to-month change in »t is recorded
in two consecutive values of ¢»t, guaranteeing that ¢»t exhibits high autocorrelation. Thus I allow
for autocorrelation in my error term.
6 Estimation: Equation and Technique
The basic speci¯cation for this study takes the form
¢»e















Where » is one of the macroeconomic variables for which panelists record forecasts. I look at
seven of these variables: GDP growth, CPI in°ation, 90 day interest rates, 10 year bond yields,
the level of unemployment, growth in household consumption, and growth in business investment.
The ¯rst subscript, f, refers to the forecaster which is the cross-sectional unit of analysis. In cases
where the variable is constant across all forecasters within the same country, this subscript has
been changed to c to remind the reader (and the writer) of this fact. The second subscript refers
to the time dimension of the panel and is indexed monthly. All forecast data is monthly. Data on
realized variables is monthly except GDP growth data, which is quarterly. The dependent variable
is the change in expectations over the measurement window. X is a vector of ¯ve macroeconomic
variables: output growth, unemployment, in°ation, and short and long-term rates. The summation
on the RHS consists of the changes in the realized values of these variables over the three most
recent quarters.12 MME and CME are indicators of whether the country is a Mediterranean market
economy or a coordinated market economy. The classi¯cation is taken from Hall and Soskice
(2001). The speci¯cation allows partisan political surprise to a®ect forecasts di®erently in di®erent
economies.
The next question is how to estimate equation (6). At each point in time for each country, we
draw a number of di®erent forecasting models (panelists) from the urn and record their forecasts.
Having multiple panelists for each country is something like having repeated draws of the same
experiment. The fact that several observations have been made on the same country on the same
window has simply picked up more noise with little extra signal. On the other hand, a one-month window results
in smaller point estimates indicating a large part of the movement in forecasts takes place the month following the
election. This suggests a signi¯cant part of election uncertainty is resolved by the post-electoral formation of the
governing coalition rather than on Election Day
12These are not quarters as de¯ned by the calendar year but rather they are the three most recent three-month
periods. Thus in May, the three most recent \quarters" cover February-May, November-February, and August-
November. For GDP growth, this will actually correspond to the change over the past three calendar quarters
because data is quarterly. But as the other series are monthly, this allows for the e®ects of the most recent past data.
18date raises the possibility of contemporaneous correlation: all the panelists from one country have
something in common in their forecasting due to the fact that they are looking at the same country
and change expectations at the same time in response to the same events. Country-speci¯c shocks
not accounted for by the set of explanatory variables are picked up by the error term, resulting in
contemporaneous correlation of errors from forecasters in the same country.13 Positive correlation
of errors among forecasters observing the same country (as is expected) would result in underesti-
mation of the true standard errors. To correct for this, I use panel corrected standard errors which





6= 0 for f;f0 2 c (8)
Another possible problem is serial correlation in the errors. Gallo et al (2002) present evidence
of herding behavior in Consensus data for the US, UK, and Japan for 1993-1996 and suggest that
such herding might generate ¯rst order serial correlation in forecast errors as forecasters attempt to
hit the group mean or follow a leader. The herding discussed by Gallo et al would imply negative
serial correlation in the errors of equation (6). Imagine the economy is hit with a shock about
which panelists have heterogeneous opinions, resulting in heterogeneous changes to their forecasts.
Then, according to the story, before answering the second post-shock survey, the panelists look at
their position relative to their peers in the ¯rst survey after the shock and adjust toward the mean
forecast. This behavior would result in negative autocorrelation of my LHS variable as those who
reacted most strongly to the event will then take a step back in the other direction once they have
observed their peers. The story remains unchanged if the panelists all follow a particular leading
analyst rather than reverting to the mean.14
However, visual inspection of the data suggests a di®erent pattern. If one sorts forecasts from
bullish to bearish, panelists seem to stake out relative positions within the array of forecasts and
adhere to them for several consecutive surveys rather than herding toward the mean or toward a
leading forecaster. This high persistence in the forecasts is probably due to the lengthy forecast
horizon and thus the long feedback time. However, this implies autocorrelation in the level, but
not necessarily in the ¯rst di®erence of the forecasts. Indeed, I ¯nd no evidence of the negative
serial correlation in the ¯rst di®erence of the errors that would come from herding. Nonetheless,
I do control for serial correlation because the two-month measurement window implies ¯rst-order
serial correlation.
Given these factors, I estimate the model by GLS, specifying an error-covariance matrix which
allows for contemporaneous correlation across panelists within the same country (equation ??clustering))
as well as ¯rst order serial correlation. Thus the error term is
²it = ½²i;t¡1 + ´it (9)
where j½j < 1 and ´it is iid with zero mean and constant variance.
13An excellent example of this is the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. The data show a swift and sizable
reaction by panelists predicting severe negative consequences for the US economy. This reaction in expectations was
certainly not captured by any of the explanatory variables. And while panelists predicted dips in other countries as
well, the movement of expectations was understandably much higher in the US than for any other country. Clearly
then, the error terms for the months after September 2001 were large and in the same direction for all US panelists.
While 9/11/2001 is exceptional in magnitude, other country-speci¯c events undoubtedly produce similar, if smaller,
e®ects.
14This analysis assumes that a panelist's reaction to the event is uncorrelated with his previous position relative to
the panel mean. If, in reaction to positive news, those who were previously pessimists react more strongly than those
who were previously optimists, then we might support positive serial correlation of the errors as a result of herding.
19Table 4: Individual Country Regressions
Dependent Variable
Variety Country GDP Growth HH Cons. Bus. Invest. Unemp. CPI 90-Day Rates 10 Year Yield
United States + + + + - + +
LME
Canada + + + + + + -
France + - - - + + +
MME
Italy + + + - + - -
Germany - - - - + - -
Japan - - + - + - -
CME
Netherlands - - + . + + -
Norway + - + . + + -
Sweden - - - . - - -
UK (LME) and Spain (MME) cannot be estimated. A \." indicates no forecast data.
These are the signs ±1 from equation (6) estimated separately for each country.
7 Results
Despite strong a priori reasons for believing that the underlying institutions of capitalism a®ect
the nature of politically induced macroeconomic volatility, it is worth taking a broader look before
estimating equation (6) to be sure that varieties of capitalism describe the underlying variation.
Table 4 and Figure 3 o®er two initial cuts showing that forecasts respond di®erently in these
di®erent sets of countries.
Table 4 reports the sign of ±1 from estimating equation (6) for each country individually rather
than grouping into LMEs, MMEs, and CMEs. While there are too few events to emphasize any
single point estimate, the pattern of signs is instructive. Notice in particular that liberal surprise
leads to increases in forecasts of output growth in MMEs and LMEs and decreases in forecasts of
output growth in CMEs. At the same time, forecast unemployment moves in di®erent direction in
MMEs and LMEs. Meanwhile, in°ation forecasts increase (and strongly so) in MMEs and also in
CMEs but are mainly una®ected in LMEs. The pattern of signs indicates groupings corresponding
to Hall and Soskice's categories.
Figure 3 shows that partisan e®ects in output growth forecasts vary by institutional group.
First the sample is sorted into three groups by variety of capitalism. Second, within each group
of countries, elections are identi¯ed and split according to whether the liberal or the conservative
alternative won. Then, for all the elections in an institutional group which generate the same
direction of political surprise, the average monthly change in forecasts is plotted for nine months
before and after the election. Such a series plots, for example, the average path of expectations in
a liberal market economy before and after an election in which the liberal alternative was elected.
Plotting the series for liberal and conservative outcomes is essentially a graph of the right-hand
plot from Figure 2. The extent that we see separation between the two lines in a single panel
around the election is the extent to which forecasters respond di®erently to liberal and conservative
surprise. And the extent to which the di®erent panels display di®erent patterns is the extent to
which countries with di®erent varieties of capitalism experience politically induced macroeconomic
volatility of a di®erent character. The three panels of Figure 3 show three rather di®erent patterns.
In liberal market economies, conservative surprise is greeted by a drop in output forecasts; in
Mediterranean market economies there is a similar bias against conservative governments though
the reaction is much less pronounced and less obviously tied to the election; and in coordinated
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market economies, the election of conservative governments is greeted with an increase in output
forecasts and the election of liberal government by a decrease in output forecasts.
Table 4 gives a sense that the country-level heterogeneity in the data is aptly captured by
grouping countries according to their variety of capitalism. Figure 3 gives further evidence that the
three groups display di®erent responses to election surprise. But more importantly, looking at the
time series shows that there is a real response to elections. The series for liberal and conservative
victory separate in response to the election but move roughly together before and after. Now we
can run equation (6) with con¯dence in the speci¯cation.
I've run equation (6) for seven di®erent variables: growth rate of output, level of unemployment,
change in household consumption, change in business investment, change in consumer prices, level
of 90 day interest rates, and level of 10 year bond yield. 15
Table 5 shows the raw coe±cients from equation (6). The total e®ect of SURPRISE on forecasts
in LMEs is captured by ±1, for MMEs it is ±1+±2, and for CMEs it is ±1+±3. Table 6 sums the proper
terms to deliver the total partial e®ect by capitalist system for each of the seven macroeconomic
variables over which forecasts are recorded.
The regression coe±cient is the partial e®ect of a unit change in SURPRISE. SURPRISE = 1
means the right was expected with certainty but the left was actually victorious. Therefore, the
15As mentioned in the Data section above, the original sample in 1989 consists of the G7; the four other countries
are added in two waves in January 1995 (Netherlands, Spain, Sweden) and June 1998 (Norway). Since these countries
have been added in descending order of GDP, and larger countries tend to have less volatile GDP growth, there is
some small danger of bias in the GDP growth regressions due to sample bias. To be sure, I reran the regressions
using only data since June 1998, the date at which the sample was full. The results are not markedly di®erent from
the full sample.
21Table 5: Basic Regression Results
Dependent Variable
» GDP Growth HH Cons. Bus. Invest. Unemp. CPI 90-Day Rates 10 Year Yield
0.699 0.200 3.033 -0.026 -0.006 0.460 0.184
SURPRISE (±1)
[0.030]*** [0.045]*** [0.086]*** [0.017] [0.015] [0.043]*** [0.036]***
-0.097 0.236 -2.202 -0.323 0.346 0.421 -0.171
SURPRISE*MME (±2)
[0.094] [0.209] [0.221]*** [0.122]** [0.195] [0.843] [0.714]
-1.869 -1.439 -5.575 0.353 0.218 -1.166 -0.359
SURPRISE*CME (±3)
[0.401]*** [0.452]*** [1.504]*** [0.112]** [0.137] [0.330]*** [0.070]***
observations 21052 20935 20672 16558 20965 19259 18836
Standard errors in brackets
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
GLS with dependent variable ¢»
e
t
Controls: change in the realized values of output growth, unemployment, consumer price in°ation,
3-month interest rates, and 10-year bond yields over the previous three quarters plus a constant.
Table 6: Total Partial E®ect by Capitalist System
Dependent Variable
» GDP Growth HH Cons. Bus. Invest. Unemp. CPI 90-Day Rates 10 Year Yield
0.699 0.200 3.033 -0.026 -0.006 0.460 0.184
LMEs (±1)
[0.030]*** [0.045]*** [0.086]*** [0.017] [0.015] [0.043]*** [0.036]***
0.602 0.436 0.831 -0.35 0.339 0.881 0.014
MMEs (±1 + ±2)
[0.091]*** [0.209]* [0.165]*** [0.113]** [0.189] [0.856] [0.717]
-1.170 -1.239 -2.542 0.326 0.212 -0.706 -0.174
CMEs (±1 + ±3)
[0.404]** [0.441]** [1.536] [0.116]** [0.130] [0.326]* [0.075]**
observations 21052 20935 20672 16558 20965 19259 18836
Standard errors in brackets
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
GLS with dependent variable ¢»
e
t
Controls: change in the realized values of output growth, unemployment, consumer price in°ation,
3-month interest rates, and 10-year bond yields over the previous three quarters plus a constant.
22regression coe±cient, the partial change in forecasts due to a unit change in SURPRISE, represents
the full perceived di®erence between the macroeconomic performance under the policies of the left
and performance under the policies of the right. 16 The data are measured in percentage points,
thus the coe±cient on output growth corresponds to a partisan di®erence in expected output growth
of 0.7% for the three LMEs, 0.6% for the three MMEs, and 1.2% for the ¯ve CMEs in my sample
during the period 1989-2004. 17
Because the study contains relatively few events, there is always the possibility that the results
are driven by an outlier. For each of the 34 elections, I have rerun the regressions with the election
in question dropped. Point estimates respond in only a limited manner and the broad story being
told is not a®ected implying these results are not being driven by any single election.
Looking ¯rst at the baseline, ±1, from table 5 shows that in LMEs, conservative governments
are expected to produce a relative recession{decrease in both consumption and investment growth
and consequent drop in interest rates{but with little e®ect on unemployment or in°ation. Now
look at the di®erence between LMEs and MMEs, captured by ±2 in table 5, or compare the total
partial e®ect of SURPRISE in MMEs with that for LMEs by looking at table 6. In MMEs,
like LMEs, liberal governments are expected to produce a boost to consumption and investment
growth and thus output growth but the e®ect di®ers between these groups of countries in three
respects. First, forecasters expect the output growth increase in MMEs to be concentrated more
on consumption and less on investment than that in LMEs. At the same time, forecasters in
MMEs expect signi¯cantly lower unemployment under liberal governments. This indicates that the
partisan divide over ¯scal stimulus is di®erent in LMEs and MMEs.
Second, unlike their counterparts in LMEs, forecasters in MMEs expect a signi¯cant increase
in in°ation along with the increased output growth. One explanation is that the forecast horizon
is typically longer in MMEs than LMEs because their elections occur, on average, earlier in the
year. In my sample, the average MME election takes place on the 113nd day of the year whereas
the average LME and CME elections take place on the 230th and 232nd days of the year. This
means the forecast horizon for output, in°ation, and unemployment (but not interest rates which
have a ¯xed twelve month horizon) is, on average, four months longer in MMEs than LMEs and
CMEs. Perhaps the e®ect of ¯scal policy on unemployment and in°ation is substantially greater
in months 8-20 than months 4-16. I cannot rule this out. More likely, however, is that there exists
either a di®erence in the partisan cleavage between LMEs and MMEs, or some structural di®erence
between the economies such that a given partisan di®erence has di®erent e®ects.
A likely candidate for the di®erent reactions of in°ation forecasts is the di®erence in central
bank independence between the two groups. A more conservative central bank in the sense of
Rogo® (1985) places lower weight on output °uctuations. As a result, a given partisan shift in
¯scal policy has a lesser e®ect on in°ation. The literature on central bank independence documents
the relatively high independence of the central banks in the US and Canada compared to much
lower independence in pre-ECB Spain and Italy. The 3 MMEs average just 1.75 on Alesina and
Summers' (1993) index of CBI while the three LMEs average 2.7 (and the 5 CMEs average 2.6).
However, while CBI might explain patterns in in°ation forecasts, it cannot shed light the behav-
ior of forecasts of unemployment, investment, and consumption. The fact that liberal governments
in MMEs are expected to lower unemployment more than their counterparts in LMEs and boost
16In a race between pure left and right which is dead even according to the polls, we would expect an election day
movement in forecasts of roughly half the magnitude of the reported coe±cient.
17For comparison, ARC report a partisan di®erence in realized output growth of 1.4% for the United States during
the period 1949-1994. See ARC Table 4.2
23consumption more than investment is probably due to the di®erent nature of the partisan divide on
¯scal policy. In other words, liberal governments in LMEs produce expansions via one set of ¯scal
policies while liberal governments in MMEs produce expansion via a di®erent set of policies. How-
ever, a thorough investigation of this question will have to wait for a model of strategic interaction
between the ¯scal and monetary authorities.18
The last interesting aspect concerns the di®erent e®ects on the yield curve and constitutes
further evidence that the interaction between the ¯scal and monetary authorities is an important
determinant of the character of partisan cycles. In LMEs, it is expected that the boom from liberal
governments will result in a moderate increase in next year's 3-month rates and next year's 10-year
rates. In MMEs, the forecast is for a very strong e®ect on next year's 3-month rates but virtually
no e®ect on next year's 10-year rates. In other words, in LMEs, the di®erence between the left and
right is a translation of the forecasted yield curve whereas in MMEs a the di®erence is a rotation
of the forecasted yield curve. Evans and Marshall (2002) argue that ¯scal policy, to the extent
that it a®ects household's marginal propensity to consume, ought to result in a translation of the
yield curve; the only policy shock that results in a rotation of the yield curve is a monetary policy
shock. These results, then, suggest that forecasters in the 1990s believed not only ¯scal, but also
monetary policy in MMEs varied with the elected policy-makers. Apparently economic forecasters
agreed with Alesina and Summers that central banks in MMEs were less autonomous than those
in LMEs.
Shifting attention to CMEs, I ¯nd that the partisan cleavage in these countries is radically dif-
ferent than that in MMEs or LMEs. In CMEs, it is conservative governments which are expected
to produce an output boom relative to their liberal counterparts. The increased output growth
associated with conservative governments in CMEs is, relative to that associated with liberal gov-
ernments in LMEs, more strongly visible in consumption than investment and is accompanied by
a decrease in unemployment, again suggesting a signi¯cantly di®erent partisan cleavage over ¯scal
policy. But though they produce a boom, conservative governments are also associated with a
decrease in in°ation. As far as interest rates, conservative governments are associated with higher
rates in both the short and the long term: a translation of the yield curve. This suggests that
in CMEs, partisan di®erences in policy are con¯ned to ¯scal policy, which is consistent with the
relatively high average index of CBI among these countries. But in CMEs, conservative ¯scal policy
is perceived to be strictly superior to liberal ¯scal policy, delivering higher output growth, lower
unemployment, and lower in°ation.
On the whole, the three groups are characterized by signi¯cantly di®erent patterns. In the
LMEs and MMEs, it is liberal parties who are associated with expansion while in CMEs it is the
conservative parties. The character of that expansion also di®ers across the groups. In LMEs,
forecasters expect the left to achieve extra growth, without an e®ect on unemployment, at virtually
no cost to in°ation. In MMEs, forecasters expect the left to deliver both higher output growth
and lower unemployment, but at the cost of higher in°ation. And in CMEs, forecasters expect the
right to deliver higher growth, lower in°ation, and lower unemployment. The clear implication is
that partisan di®erences over ¯scal policy vary considerably by country.
18Dixit and Lambertini (2003) do model the strategic interaction of independent ¯scal and monetary policy author-
ities but their model is based on a new-Keynesian framework and thus a completely forward-looking Phillips curve.
It is thus unsuited to the current purposes.
24Table 7: Forecast Errors in Election and Non-Election Years
Dependent Variable
» GDP Growth HH Cons. Bus. Invest. Unemp. CPI 90-Day Rates 10 Year Yield
0.187 -0.034 -0.242 0.129 -0.020 0.057 0.045
Election Year Dummy (¯)
[0.180] [0.192] [0.733] [0.132] [0.102] [0.054] [0.045]
0.183 -0.061 1.460 0.307 0.220 0.022 0.035
Constant (®¯)
[0.143] [0.152] [0.516]*** [0.088]*** [0.091]** [0.116] [0.085]
observations 28186 27202 27824 29110 24103 27601 26841
Standard errors in brackets
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
GLS with dependent variable »t ¡ Et¡h»t
8 Forecast Quality
This paper measures the change in economic forecasts induced by a change in expected political
outcomes and, from this response, infers the perceived di®erence between the two parties' platforms.
The degree to which this perceived di®erence corresponds to the actual di®erence between the
parties' platforms depends on the ability of the forecasters to properly process election news. I
look at this in two parts. First, are forecast errors larger in election years? Second, are forecast
errors correlated with the surprising and/or unsurprising components of political surprise which
were revealed during the previous month (and thus ought to be incorporated if agents properly
process the information)?
»t ¡ Et¡h»t = ®¯ + ¯ElectionYearDummyt¡h + ¹t (10)
»t ¡ Et¡h»t = ®° + °1¢(ActualGov)t¡h + °2¢(ExpectedGov)t¡h + ºt (11)
Estimates of ®¯ reveal that forecasters systematically overestimated investment, unemployment,
and in°ation during this period. But this mistake does not seem to be indicative of an inability to
process political information. The failure to reject ¯ = 0 for any of the seven variables suggests that
forecasts are not systematically worse in election years. Estimates of °1 suggest that forecasters
systematically underestimate the negative (positive) e®ect of a liberal (conservative) government
on ten year bond yields. However, in general, the estimates are insigni¯cant, suggesting that the
political information, including both the surprising component revealed in the election (°2) and the
component revealed prior to the election (°1), is well incorporated in post-election forecasts.
Gallo et al have suggested that Consensus forecasts often su®er from persistent errors because
forecast horizons are long and thus feedback is slow. Moreover, if the underlying economy about
which panelists are forecasting evolves, slow feedback may ensure that the time-scale on which
errors are perceived and eliminated is not much faster than that over which new sources of error
are generated. This is perhaps true concerning their ability to properly process the array of eco-
nomic events which, in aggregate, push the macroeconomy this way or that but can be di±cult to
properly weigh and interpret. However, these results suggest that Consensus forecasters process the
information content of (highly visible) national elections in a manner approximating the canonical
rational, forward-looking agent with a properly speci¯ed model.
25Table 8: Forecaster's Use of Political Information
Dependent Variable
» GDP Growth HH Cons. Bus. Invest. Unemp. CPI 90-Day Rates 10 Year Yield
0.020 -0.004 0.755 0.049 -0.241 -0.005 -0.324
¢ ActualGov (°1)
[0.057] [0.020] [0.107] [0.035] [0.027] [0.070] [0.037]**
0.224 -0.070 1.391 0.336 0.214 0.035 0.042
¢ ExpectedGov (°2)
[0.039] [0.014] [0.594] [0.117] [0.126]* [0.091] [0.097]***
-0.057 0.016 0.070 0.057 0.002 -0.016 0.074
Constant (®°)
[0.139] [0.138] [0.518]*** [0.076]*** [0.084]** [0.118] [0.087]
observations 28163 27179 27801 29087 24096 27582 26823
Standard errors in brackets
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
GLS with dependent variable »t ¡ Et¡h»t
9 Conclusion
This paper has developed a new method for the measurement of politically induced macroeconomic
°uctuations. Measuring the change in economic forecasts as a function of the change in expected
¯scal policy delivers a measure of the perceived di®erence between the ¯scal policies of the left
and right. The results demonstrate that forecasters do respond swiftly and signi¯cantly to the
information content of elections. However, the e®ective di®erence between the policies of the left
and the right is more complex than the prevailing view. Fiscal policy is not a uni-dimensional
choice of the degree of ¯scal stimulus, but also involves both regulatory policy and the choice of
the method by which to deliver ¯scal stimulus. Because the policy-space is multi-dimensional, the
axis of variation between left and right varies by country. The institutions by which an economy
is organized a®ect the framing of and feasible solutions to the policy issues which de¯ne left and
right. As a result, the e®ective di®erence between ¯scal policies of the left and right depend on
the underlying political economy. Among the 11 advanced economies that comprise my sample,
there exist three distinct patterns in the response of forecasts to electoral surprise corresponding
to the three distinct varieties of capitalism. In liberal market economies, forecasters expect the
left to achieve higher output growth, without a®ecting unemployment, at virtually no cost to
in°ation. In Mediterranean market economies, forecasters expect the left to deliver both higher
output growth and lower unemployment, but at the cost of higher in°ation. And in coordinated
market economies, forecasters expect the right to deliver higher growth, lower in°ation, and lower
unemployment. Fiscal policy cleavages between the left and the right, and hence politically induced
macroeconomic volatility, vary a great deal across di®erent systems of capitalism.
These results are not only a reminder that ¯scal policy is multi-dimensional, it is important
evidence that economic agents perceive important di®erences in partisan policies. Moreover, it
is evidence that politically induced macroeconomic volatility is not uniform, but is a product of
the institutional environment. To the extent that this paper establishes the importance of the
institutions of wage bargaining, vocational training, shareholder protection, and others in both
in°uencing policy and channeling its e®ects, the next step is building an understanding of how they
do so.
This suggests at least three directions for future research. First, both PT and RPT assume
the elected o±cial directly controls the price level, an assumption which is uncomfortable in an era
of widespread central bank independence. What is needed is a model of the strategic interaction
26between an (elected) ¯scal authority and a more or less independent monetary policy authority,
founded on a Phillips curve capable of generating partisan cycles. This would enable more study of
how political cycles might vary with both the goals of these institutions and the character of their
strategic interaction. Second, examining the reaction of di®erent types of forecasters would give
us an idea of the degree to which various di®erent pricing agents in the economy react to political
information. Finally, opinion polls are gradually giving way to political markets which generate
continuous measures of political forecasts. Use of such data would enable this kind of study to be
extended to include campaigns as well, thus capturing a wider span of political-information which
may cause macro-economic volatility.
At the moment, study of partisan cycles is largely restricted to advanced, Western economies.
But as forecast series become long enough to cover multiple elections, this approach can be extended
to countries from other regions such as Latin America and Africa. The attendant increase in
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